It is via the Emirate that the West has leverage over Hamas
by SIMON MAYALL 31 October 2023 • 2:40pm
The release of some of the civilian hostages, in the wake of the Hamas-led atrocities of October 7, is one of the few items of good news in an otherwise universally worrying situation in the Middle East. This small, but important success, and some more may still follow, has been due to the mediation of the small, gas-rich state of Qatar. Qatar, not signatories of the Abraham Accords, have been able to fulfil this role because they have been playing host to elements of the Hamas leadership for a decade. In addition, they have channelled billions of dollars into Gaza, controlled by Hamas, over recent years.
However, while the Qatari ability to help facilitate hostage releases is welcomed, this closeness to Hamas, an organisation that both the US and UK have designated as “terrorists”, long before they demonstrated ISIS levels of barbarity in the recent attacks, makes many question Qatar’s long-term agenda. But is that fair? How is it that Qatar, a nation the size of Yorkshire, is taking the lead in mediating efforts with Hamas and is seen as the best option by the UK and international community to release the hostages?
Qatar became a newly independent state in 1971, along with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, on the British withdrawal from “East of Suez”. From the start, Qatar sought to develop a distinctive, and independent, foreign policy. While proving to be an important, close and reliable energy supplier, and military partner of the West, Qatar also chose to develop and sustain linkages with a range of countries and parties, not all of whom Qatar’s western allies approved.
In 1996, after the US decided to abandon its military basing in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Qatar funded the development of the huge Al Udeid air base, currently home to over 10,000 US service personnel. The vast bulk of air missions against Islamic State was flown from Al Udeid, US Central Command forward HQ is also set up there.
Even while Qatar was supplying energy, investing its vast oil and gas wealth, and hosting US and Nato military forces, it was also being accused of supporting and accommodating proscribed organisations. However, confusion over the aims and agendas of nation within the Gulf, particularly during the Arab Spring, was not confined to Qatar.
Likewise, Qatar’s relationship with Hamas was not all it seemed. It was the US who originally asked the Emir to host the Hamas politburo, after the Hamas – Fatah conflict of 2006, in order to provide a conduit for the US to continue to engage with the Palestinians. This action was also endorsed by Israel, and by other nations. Calls for the Hamas office to be shut down ring hollow – would international security and the lives of the hostages be better served were Hamas to move to Tehran with all communication going through the Iranians?
The substantial levels of “aid” that Qatar provided for Gaza does not neatly equate to the narrative that accuses them of “funding Hamas”. Intent matters, and for those who know the system, the “aid” that Qatar delivers is closely coordinated with Israel, Egypt, the UN and the US, and it is carefully recorded and monitored. Until the latest outbreak of violence, most aid constituted essential supplies, such as food and medicine, all with specially-designated UN seals attached. Cash, hand-carried over the border, was, technically, distributed directly to needy families, and to pay the salaries of public servants in Gaza, each individual signing in triplicate, with copies for the UN, Israel and Qatar.
However, along with the humanitarian aid, Qatar also gave significant sums of money for the re-building and re-construction of Gaza, and given the levels of corruption across the region, Hamas will have been able to appropriate a significant proportion of these funds. Despite this, even the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, supported the Qatari decision to transfer millions of dollars to Gaza.
All through the “blockade” – the Gulf diplomatic crisis caused by the decision from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to economically ‘blockade’ Qatar by land, sea and air between 2017 and early 2021 – it continued to provide the air base for operations against Islamic State, continued to meet its obligations to energy customers, including Dubai, and continued to invest and to grow. Late in 2021, having largely settled the issues behind the blockade, Qatar facilitated the evacuation of US and British citizens from Kabul during the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Qatar was only able perform that role because they were coordinating with the Taliban via their office in Doha, opened again with US approval. In 2022, Qatar successfully hosted the first Middle East football World Cup.
Sympathy for the Palestinians maybe widespread across the region but we must also acknowledge that Hamas’ key backer in the region is Iran. Emotions are running high, but this is precisely the time for clear-thinking, for acknowledging the complexity of the Middle East, for understanding the significance of our strategic partnerships in the Middle East, and for Britain to be capitalising on our shared history and interests. We must acknowledge that sympathy for the Palestinians is widespread across the region, although not support for Hamas. I am encouraged that our Government and Prime Minister seem to get this. They understand that, as a permanent UN Security Council member, words have real world consequences, and that there are no advantages in rushing to judgement, or in pandering to prejudice.
I have written before about the need for Britain to be clearer about who its friends and enemies are. Many of the people who criticised Qatar during the World Cup, did so with no regard for the religious and cultural norms of conservative societies, and often encouraged by other detractors of the country. Some of the same people will now be railing against Israel, one of the few, democratic, open and liberal societies in
the region. Many of those that criticise our dependency on Qatari oil and gas are the same zealots who stopped Britain taking advantage of fracking, or of the North Sea energy reserves. Like it, or not, Britain will remain dependent on Qatari gas for many years to come.
There is an imperative need for Britain to put national interest and security back at the heart of our foreign policy objectives, and we need to adopt a more realistic and pragmatic assessment. The conflict in Israel has brought that message into sharp focus. It has been reported that after Hamas’s actions, and after this crisis, Qatar is open to reconsidering its relationship. We must continue to hope, within the miserable situation in which Israel and Gaza find themselves, that the channels of communication it has with Hamas may be able to offer and deliver some comfort to the families of the remaining hostages.
Lieutenant General Sir Simon Mayall is the MoD’s former Senior Adviser on the Middle East
